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RECENT CASES
APPELLATE PROCEDURE FORCE OF CIRCUIT PRECEDENT
NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT THREE-JUDGE PANELS MAY
DECLARE PifiOR CASES OVERRULED WHEN INTERVENING
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT UNDERCUTS THE THEORY OF
EARLIER DECISIONS Miller Gammie 335 F.3d 889 gth Cir
2003 en banc
The nations courts of appeals have struggled to devise coherent
approach to harmonizing existing circuit case law with intervening
decisions of the Supreme Court.1 When the Court directly overrules
decision of court of appeals it is agreed that the overruled decision
loses the force of law But when Supreme Court opinion disfavors
circuits jurisprudential theory the courts of appeals must determine to
what extent cases relying on the rejected theory remain good law Re
cently in Miller Gammie Gammie JJ2 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc adopted an approach
that directs three-judge panels to reconsider both panel and en banc
decisions that would otherwise be binding precedent when those deci
sions are clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of inter
vening higher authority.3 This test is unbounded and will likely
prove impossible to administer result foretold by the Gammie II
courts error in concluding that Ninth Circuit absolute immunity ju
risprudence was effectively overruled by Supreme Court cases en
tirely compatible with existing circuit decisions To preserve the pre
dictability and coherence of their jurisprudence courts of appeals
should instead adopt default rule that presumes the validity of case
law not explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court
Several recent cases demonstrate the extent to which the courts of appeals have struggled
with this difficult question Compare Union of Needletrades Indus Textile Employees INS
336 F.3d 200 210 2d Cir 2003 holding that Second Circuit panels may overrule decisions of
prior panels where there has been an intervening Supreme Court decision that casts doubt on our
controlling precedent emphasis added citing Boothe Hammock 6o F.2d 66i 663 2d Cir
2979 In re Sealed Case No 97-3112 iS F.3d 128 23 D.C Cir rgg en banc correcting
panel for erroneously concluding that the Supreme Court had effectively overruled prior circuit
authority and Dawson Scott 50 F.3d 884 893 n.20 iith Cir 1995 allowing panel review
when case appears to be overruled
F.3d 889 gth Cir 2003 en banc Gammie II
Id at 893 Prior Ninth Circuit panels had suggested that they had discretion to declare de
cisions of the court overruled by intervening Supreme Court precedent See e.g Galbraith
County of Santa Clara 307 F.3d 1119 2223 9th Cit 2002 holding that circuit law can be over
ruled by subsequent Supreme Court decisions that are closely on point quoting United States
Lancetlotti 761 F.2d 363 366 9th Cir 985 internal quotation marks omitted Gammie II
however represents the en banc endorsement of this standard for the first time
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In December 1996 the Nevada Division of Child and Family Ser
vices DCFS removed twelve-year-old boy Earl and his older
brother from their home to protect them from sexual abuse.4 Nancy
Gammie DCFS social worker assigned to the boys cases eventually
succeeded in petitioning the Nevada Juvenile Court to place Earl in
foster home.5 In December 1997 Earl was placed in home along
with his foster parents two natural children twelve-year-old girl
and nine-year-old boy.6 Fran Zito DCFS social therapist who
treated Earl assured foster parents that there was nothing to
worry about with respect to the safety of the couples natural chil
dren.7 Two months later howeVer Earls foster parents discovered
that Earl had molested their son soon afterwards Earl was arrested
and admitted to sodomizing the child.8
In 1999 Earls guardian ad litem filed suit in Nevada state court
asserting claims against DCFS Gammie and Zito for redress of con
stitutional violations in connection with Earls foster home placement.9
The defendants removed the suit to the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada and successfully moved to dismiss on Elev
enth Amendment grounds the claims against DCFS Gammie and
Zito in their official capacities The district court declined however
to dismiss the claims against Gammie and Zito individually ordering
discovery on all of the issues that relate to absolute immunity
defense Gammie and Zito had asserted as grounds for dismissal.11
Both defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit.12 In his analysis of
the merits of the defendants claims of absolute immunity Judge
OScannlain writing for unanimous three-judge panel asserted that
the Ninth Circuits previous decision in Babcock Tyler3 set forth
this Circuits law on absolute immunity for state workers involved in
child welfare proceedings.4 In Babcock the court had concluded
that because caseworkers need to exercise independent judgment in
fulfilling their post-adjudication duties absolute immunity extended





Id Although the foster parents filed similar suit their claims were settled before the case
reached the Ninth Circuit Id at 983 fl.2
Id atg85
Id at 98586
12 Id at 956 Because there was no final order over which the court of appeals could exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C 2292 2000 the Ninth Circuit could obtain jurisdiction over
the appeal only by way of the collateral order doctrine Id at g8586
13 88 F.2d 497 9th Cir 989
14 Gammie 292 F.3d at 988 citing Babcock 884 F.2d at 497
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to social workers foster care placement decisions.15 Applying Babcock
to Gammies and Zitos appeals Judge OScannlain concluded that the
case was factually indistinguishable from Babcock1 and that the de
fendants were thus absolutely immune.17
The Ninth Circuit promptly vacated the panel opinion and granted
rehearing en banc.8 In the subseque.nt en banc opinion Chief Judge
Schroeder argued that intervening Supreme Court precedent rather
than Babcock should have controlled the panels analysis of the de
fendants absolute immunity claims.19 The Chief Judge asserted that
the Supreme Courts decisions in Antoine Byers Anderson Inc.20
and Kalina Fletcher21 established that the test we formulated in
Babcock no longer relevant standard.22 Accordingly Chief
Judge Schroeder concluded the extent that social workers
make discretionary decisions that are not functionally similar
to prosecutorial or judicial decisions only qualified not absolute im
munity is available.23
In the final section of her opinion Chief JudgeSchroeder assessed
whether the district court and the three-judge panel were bound
to apply Babcock until it had been expressly overruled by an en banc
court The Chief Judge concluded that when the relevant court of
last resort undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the
prior circuit precedent in such way that the cases are clearly irrecon
cilable three-judge panel of Ninth Circuit should consider
themselves bound by the intervening higher authority and reject the
prior opinion as having been effectively overruled.25 The court
therefore concluded that Antoine and Kalina rendered Babcock effec
tively overruled and that neither the panel nor the district court
should have considered itself bound by Babcocks analysis.26
Id at 989 quoting Babcock 884 F.2d at 503
61d at991
17 Although the panel members were profoundly disturbed that persons acting in the name of
the State of Nevada would place known sexual predator into home with two small children
id at 990 the panel concluded that it was bound by Babcock to hold Gammie and Zito absolutely
immune Id at 991
18 Miller Gammie 309 F.3d 1209 9th Cir 2002
19 Gammie II F.3d at 900
20 o8 U.s 429 ia see id at 43637
21
522 U.S n8 see id at I293I
22 Gammie II F.3d at 897
23 Id at 898
24 Id at 899
25 Id at 900
26 Id
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In brief concurring opinion Judge OScannlain27 wrote sepa
rately to note firm conviction that outcome was reachable
only by way of en banc review.28 Accordingly Judge OScannlain re
fused to join the final section of the en banc opinion reiterating his
view that three-judge panels lack the authority overrule prior
decisions of three-judge panels.29
Gammie Iis direction to Ninth Circuit panels represents the most
recent manifestation of growing propensity among federal circuits to
direct three-judge panels to disregard controlling circuit precedent in
view of intervening Supreme Court opinions The circuits have dif
fered in their articulation of the requisite connection between the rele
vant Supreme Court case law and the circuit court case to be effec
tively overruled adopting standards ranging from directly
applicable3 to clearly irreconcilable32 to requiring only that the
Supreme Court have cast doubt upon the circuits reasoning.33
Whatever the operative language this general trend undermines
principal utility of determinations by the courts of appeals in banc as
it has been identified by the Supreme Court namely making it
possible for majority of judges always to control and thereby
to secure uniformity and continuity in decisions.34 This ap
proach offers judges no analytical means of identifying overruled cases
and therefore threatens the stability of circuit case law Courts of ap
peals should instead adopt default presumption in favor of the sur
vival of previous decisions unless case is explicitly overruled by the
Supreme Court
As Gammie II itself demonstrates judges will find it difficult in
deed to determine the viability of circuit law under rule that asks
whether higher court has undercut the theory or reasoning underly
ing the prior circuit precedent.35 Although the en banc panel held
that the absolute immunity landscape had undergone fundamental
changes that rendered Babcock undercut and therefore overruled the
27
Judge Tallman joined Judge OScannlains opinion Judges Kozinski and Tashima filed
separate concurrences in which they continued their ongoing debate regarding the en banc courts
use of dicta to provide guidance to future three-judge panels See id at goo Kozinski concur
ring id at 902 Tashima concurring
28 Id at 901 OScanalain concurring in part
29 Id at 902
30 See supra note
31 Dawson Scott 50 F.3d 884 893 n.2o th Cit 1995
32 Ganzrnie II F.3d at 893
33 Union of Needletrades Indus Textile Employees INS 336 F.3d 200 210 2d Cit 2003
internal quotation marks omitted citing Boothe Hammock 6o F.2d 66r 663 2d Cit
34 United States American-Foreign S.S Corp 363 U.S 68 689go ig6o quoting Albert
Branson Mans Hearing and Rehearing Ces in Bane 14 F.R.D 96 internal quota
tion marks omitted
35 Gammie II F.3d at 900
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Courts absolute immunity jurisprudence as articulated in Imbler
Pachtman36 and subsequent cases is by no means clearly irrecon
cilable with the theory underlying Babcock.3 The Imbler Court con
cluded that prosecutor was absolutely immune from liability arising
from the knowing use of false testimony because that conduct was re
lated to the prosecutors function as an advocate in judicial proceed
ings38 Although Imbler set aside whether prosecutor would be
similarly immune for those aspects of his responsibility that cast him
in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that
of advocate39 the Court made clear that the critical inquiry in deter
mining the availability of absolute immunity was the functional na
ture of the activities at issue and whether the reasons for absolute
immunity including the need for independence in prosecutorial de
cisionmaking were closely related to those activities
The Courts absolute immunity jurisprudence after Imbler has
merely emphasized the importance of the function at issue in determin
ing whether immunity is available In holding that court reporter
was not absolutely immune from liability for failing to produce tran
script of court proceedings the Antoine Court concluded that rela
tionship between judicial process and official duty does not render one
absolutely immune because it is not sufficient for obtaining absolute
immunity that the task issue be extremely important .. to the
appellate process.41 And as the en banc court recognized in Gammie
II the Kalina Courts conclusion that prosecutor could be held liable
for false statements made in support of an application for search
warrant further emphasized that performing the duties
of advocate or judge may enjoy absolute immunity for some functions
traditionally performed at common law but that protection does not
extend to many of their other functions.42
Although one could argue that Antoine and Kalina animated pre
viously unknown details of the Imbler test close reading of Babcock
reveals that the panels holding did not rely on the absolute immunity
analyses rejected by the Court after Babcock was decided Had the
36
424 U.s 409 2976
37 Indeed some Justices have described the approach initially set forth in Imbler as deeply
embedded in Courts 1983 jurisprudence Kalina Fletcher 522 U.s us r35 9i
Scalia concurring The Gammie II court agreed that Imbler .. settled the general scope
and rationale of immunity Gammie II F.3d at SgG
3$ Katina 522 U.s at 125 describing Imbters central holding
Imbler 424 U.s at 4303 n.33
Id at 423 430
Antoine Byers Anderson Inc o8 U.s 429 43637 1993 internal quotation marks
omitted
42 Gammie II F3d at 897 citing Kalina 522 US at 1293 and Antoine o8 U.5 at
435.3
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Babcock court rested its holding upon the mere relationship between
social workers and the adjudicatory process or extended social work
ers absolute immunity to their testimonial functions it might be ar
gued that the holding was threatened by the developments in Antoine
and Katina But the Babcock panel explicitly grounded its conclusion
upon its view that caseworkers need to exercise independent judg
ment in fz4filling their post-adjudication duties.43 In fact the Bab
cock panel explicitly rejected the argument that social workers post-
adjudication activities consisted of purely administrative or ministe
rial acts holding instead that the underlying policy justifications for
absolute immunity the need the exercise independent
judgment required the extension of the doctrine to social workers
post-adjudication activities.44 These policy justifications were left en
tirely undisturbed by the Courts subsequent rejection of the applica
tion of absolute immunity to activities that require no discretion of
judgment but simply attend judicial process generally If Antoine and
Kalina satisfy the Ninth Circuits standard for effectively overruling
Babcock nearly any circuit case law in even distant tension with Su
preme Court jurisprudence is in danger of being similarly held effec
tively overruled
Perhaps the most overwhelming evidence that the Court has done
nothing to threaten the viability of Babcock however has come from
the Justices themselves As Justice Thomas pointed out in 1994 the
Court has not yet addressed the threshold question whether social
workers are under any circumstances entitled to the protections of
absolute immunity.45 It is thus difficult to imagine that the Court has
reached the more difficult question raised by Babcock when social
workers might be entitled to the broadest quantum of immunity More
importantly it is difficult to conceive how as the en banc court in
sisted the changes putatively wrought by Antoine and Kalina under
mined Babcock but left untouched other Ninth Circuit decisions sus
taining absolute immunity defenses for social workers.46
Gammie II thus also demonstrates the inherent pliability of the en
banc courts standard for disregarding prior circuit precedent As
result the Gammie II approach puts the viability of innumerable cases
in doubt simply because they might be construed as being in tension
Babcock I1er 884 F.2d 498 503 9th Cit 989 emphasis added
Id at 50203
Hoffman Harris ii u.s xoôo io6o 1994 Thomas dissenting from denial of certio
rari
46 See Gammie II E3d at 898 insisting that the Ninth Circuits conclusion in other cases
that social workers are protected by absolute immunity during the adjudicatory process is consis
tent with the controlling Supreme court decisions while holding Babcock effectively overruled
by the same Supreme Court decisions
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with intervening Supreme Court opinions The courts of appeals shift
in the direction of Gamviie II therefore threatens the predictability of
the circuits case law which must rest on the bedrock principle that
prior decisions of the courts bind subsequent three-judge panels.47
Judge Scannlain has proposed more workable approach for
panels assessment of intervening Supreme Court authority.48
foundly troubled by the notion of overruling as three-judge
panel the precedent set by an earlier panel Judge OScannlain has
urged that where there is room for doubt must stay
erasers Under this approach panels would be able to overrule
prior circuit decisions only where no reasonable argument could be
advanced in favor of the proposition that settled case law has survived
intervening Supreme Court precedent.5
Perhaps the approach introduced by the D.C Circuit in Irons
Diamond5 which permits panel to hold prior case overruled by
circulating its opinion to the entire court for approval and noting the
unanimity of the court in footnote is most likely to maximize in
tracircuit jurisprudential predictability.52 Applied to the Ninth Cir
cuit the Irons procedure may result in default rule functionally in
distinguishable from Judge OScannlains approach because obtaining
the unanimous approval of all twenty-seven active judges may be even
less likely than obtaining the majority vote necessary to produce en
47 See e.g In re Complaint of Ross Island Sand Gravel 226 F.3d o5 oiS 9th Cir 2000
per curiam three judge panel of this court cannot overrule prior decision of this court
citing Morton De Oliveira 984 F.2d 289 292 9th Cir 993D This shift is particularly trou
bling in view of the infrequency with which en banc courts generally convene because the full
court will rarely review panel holdings that overrule otherwise binding circuit precedent
4S See Wolfson Watts 298 F.3d 1077 1o8485 9th Cir 2002 OScannlain concurring in
the judgment
Ed at io8 Judge OScannlains proposal comes in slightly different context namely
when the circuit should revisit its view of state law in diversity cases Still because of his broad
adherence to the notion that decisis provides crucial reassurance .. that our decisions
represent more than the subjective preferences of the concurring judges Id at roSô and because
Judge Scannlain wrote separately in Gammie II to note his firm conviction that such an out
come was reachable only by way of en banc review his proposal might apply to the prior-panel
context as well Gammie II F3d at 901 OScannlain concurring in part
50 Critics of Judge OScannlains approach might argue that his test need not lead to results
different from those produced by the Gammie ii rule of dear irreconcilability As with the sum
mary judgment standard however Judge OScannlains analysis requires panels to declare that
no reasonable argument for the continued viability of prior circuit authority exists And as in the
summary judgment context this threshold is likely to give judges pause before embarking upon
paths already trodden by previous panels In any event if it is agreed that lax standard threat
ens the predictability of intracircuit jurisprudence then courts should seek the tightest constraints
upon panels available and clearly Judge OScannlains approach features higher standard
than does the rule of Gammie II
51 670 F.2d 265 D.C Cir 981
52 Id at 268 0.11 see also christopher Banks The Politics of En Banc Review in the
Mini-Supreme Court i3 J.L POL 377 389 n.87 i7
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banc review Thus modified Irons procedure requiring for exam
ple the assent of majority of active judges to overrule existing circuit
precedent would serve the courts interest in expediency while
making it possible for majority of judges always to control and
thereby to secure uniformity and continuity in circuits deci
sions.53
The Gammie II court argued that these approaches would create
ihconsistenc between
..
circuit decisions and the reasoning
of authority embodied in decision of court of last resort
Advocates of the Gammie II rule however fail to recognize that their
approach risks the unintended reversal of circuit case law by virtue of
the Courts decisions an outcome that fails to defer to the limita
tions the Court places upon its rulings.55 Because both rules generate
unintended consequences on the one hand failing to implement Su
preme Court holdings and on the other implementing the Courts
holdings incorrectly courts should employ the rule that affords liti
gants and the Supreme Court as much predictability as possible
Granted such ex ante predictability the Court should be careful to
craft rulings that specify when circuits must revise their case law.56
The en banc court would then be forced to respond to panels pleas to
review the viability of circuit precedent in areas of law where the ap
plication of rule does not fit comfortably with countervailing Su
preme Court precedent
Either approach would be preferable to the rule of Gammie II
which encourages randomly selected three-judge panels to undo the
work of the court largely at their own discretion Ironically Gainmie
II urges this rule impliedly expressing profound faith in the ability
of panels to distinguish between prior cases that have been overruled
and those that are merely in tension with Supreme Court jurispru
dence yet is unable to live up to its own expectations Rather than
the clearly problematic approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit in
Gammie II courts of appeals should instead seek to provide default
rule that maximizes intracircuit jurisprudential predictability
53 United States American-Foreign S.S Corp 363 U.S 68 68990 igóo quoting Mans
supra note 34 at gU internal quotation marks omitted
54 Gammie II 33 F.3d at 900
55 The Supreme Court often consciously limits the reach of its holdings in manner designed
to leave some lower courts holdings intact while rendering others overruled See e.g Friends of
the Earth Inc Laidlaw Envtl Servs TOC Inc 328 U.S 167 95 2000 noting specifically
that it would be premature to address the continuing validity of areas of circuit jurisprudence
not addressed by the decision
56 Of course this approach has its own cost the Supreme Court would have to signal clearly
which circuit jurisprudence it wishes to overrule This cost although not insignificant seems
relatively small when compared to the substantial costs imposed by an approach to circuit juris
prudence that threatens the reliability of any case in tension with intervening Supreme Court
precedent
